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MEANINGFUL ACCESS UNDER BOUNDS
By: Joseph M. Giarratano
Joseph Giarratano is a prisoner on Virginia's death row
following his conviction for capital murder in 1979. His peti-
tion to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (Murray v.
Giarratano, 847 F2d 1118 (1988) is analyzed in this issue)
argued that meaningful access to the courts, as required by
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), can only be achieved if
the courts appoint counsel for defendants who want to pursue
collateral appeals. The Fourth Circuit sitting en banc agreed.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has appealed the Fourth
Circuit decision and the United States Supreme Court granted
cert. 57 U.S.L. W. 3236 (No. 88-411)-Ed.
Since the resumption of capital punishment in this country
there has been a mounting crisis concerning the need for post-
conviction representation in death cases. 1 This crisis came to
the forefront in Virginia when the State attempted to execute an
unrepresented death row prisoner who, because he could not af-
ford a lawyer, was unable to institute state habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. Earl Washington, who had just completed the direct
review of his death sentence, asked a Virginia Circuit Court
judge to appoint him a lawyer to help him file a state habeas
petition. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, and the
judge denied Mr. Washington's request; and, in the same order,
scheduled his execution. Virginia was the first state to make a
concerted effort to execute an unrepresented individual. There
were also five other death sentenced individuals who were in
need of counsel.
Marie Deans, director of the Virginia Coalition on Jails &
Prisons (a non-profit organization), had been tirelessly trying to
recruit volunteer counsel to represent these men on a pro bono
basis. Because the number of men on Virginia's death row was
continuously growing it became virtually impossible to locate
lawyers to voluntarily take these cases. The need was great and
filing deadlines were drawing near. In an effort to assist Ms.
Deans and, to gain time to locate qualified counsel, Ms. Deans
asked if I would help: I filed several motions for time exten-
sions, motions to stay the mandates, and in two instances peti-
tions for certiorari.
It was these circumstances, and the Commonwealth's une-
quivocal efforts to execute the unrepresented, that prompted my
filing of Giarranto v. Murray.2 It was my belief that the State's
efforts to execute individuals, before they had the opportunity
to exercise their right to seek post-conviction review, predicated
solely on the fact that they were indigent, illiterate, mentally
retarded, or otherwise handicapped clearly violated the constitu-
tional mandate of "adequate and meaningful" access to the
courts; and, the individuals 1st amendment rights. 3 With Mr.
Washington facing his scheduled execution I contacted Ms.
Deans, who had still not been able to locate volunteer counsel
for any of the men. I then filed the case, pro se, and through
the efforts of Ms. Deans and, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
we were able to recruit the pro bono services of the New York
firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garison, to handle the
case.
After a two day trial before the Honorable Robert R.
Merighe, Jr., U.S. District Judge, the court found that;
The matter of a death row inmates habeas cor-
pus petition is too important-both to society,
which has a compelling interest in insuring that a
sentence of death has been constitutionally imposed,
as well as to the individual involved-to leave to,
what is at best, a patchwork system of assistance.
These plaintiff's must have the continuous
assistance of counsel in developing their claims.
Judge Merighe ruled that indigent Virginia death row in-
mates are entitled to the appointment of counsel upon request
to assist them in pursuing habeas corpus relief in the state
courts, and ordered the defendants to develop a system to
assure such appointment.
The Commonwealth appealed this ruling and a three judge
panel for the Fourth Circuit (by a two to one margin) overruled
the lower court. We then petitioned the court for a rehearing en
banc and, after oral argument, the court (by a six to four
margin) affirmed the District Court decision. 4 The State has
taken exception to this ruling, and their petition for certiorari is
now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. Regardless of the
final outcome in this case it cannot be honestly argued that the
Commonwealth provides adequate and meaningful access to the
courts for those under sentence of death who are indigent, il-
literate, mentally retarded, or are otherwise handicapped.
The problems surrounding representation in capital cases
does not begin at the post-conviction level. The need for effec-
tive representation begins at the trial level. This is especially
true in Virginia where excessively uncompromising "procedural
default" rules are enforced. 5 These rules have binding effect in
both state and federal post-conviction appeals.
6
Capital murder trials are extremely complex. The body of
death penalty law is vast, constantly in flux, and forever chang-
ing. Counsel is faced with the enormous task of coming to
know the intricacies of this specialized area of the law. The
question for the capital lawyer is far more than "guilt or in-
nocence." Capital trials in Virginia are bifurcated. The penalty
phase of a capital murder trial is a complex entity in and of
itself; and, often as not, it is sorely neglected. The stakes are
life or death, and the need for reliability and skill are deman-
ding. In short, death is different. Those representing a capital
defendant at any stage should not hesitate to seek assistance,
and assistance is available in Virginia.
7
Without knowledgeable counsel at the trial level the force of
Giarratano v. Murray-should the case prevail or not-is
drastically reduced. Unless trial counsel properly preserves the
issues at trial and, on direct review, post-conviction relief will
be forfeited. One will not find, on Virginia's death row, a
single post-conviction appeal where "procedural default" is not
at issue. Individuals have been executed in this state-not
because they failed to raise meritorious claims-but because
those claims were procedurally barred from review. The impor-
tance of the problem and, the need for effective trial counsel,
cannot be overstated.
Footnotes:
1See, Mello, "Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction At-
torney Crisis on Death Row, 37 American U. L. Rev. (1988).
2688 F. Supp. 511 (1986)
3Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
4847 F.2d 1118, en banc (1988).
5See, Rules 5:17 and 5:25 of the Virginia Rules of Court. These
rules are absolute in capital cases. E.g. Quintana v. Comm.,
295 S.E.2d 643 (1982); Coppola v. Warden, 282 S.E.2d 10
(1981). To date I have not been able to locate a single capital
case in which the Virginia Supreme Court forgave an appellate
level procedural default.
6See, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Smith v. Mur-
ray, 106 S.Ct. 2661 (1986); Whitley v. Muncy, 843 F.2d 55 (4th
Cir. 1987); and, generally: Batey, "Federal Habeas Corpus
Relief and the Death Penalty: Finality with a Capital 'F"', 36
U. Fla. L. Rev. (1984).
7The Virginia Coalition on Jails & Prisons and, The Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse, provide assistance programs.
CAPITAL JURY SELECTION IN VIRGINIA
William S. Geimer*
Selection of a jury in any criminal case is a difficult task for
attorneys. First, though we talk a good game, it is a process we
know a lot less about than we think we do. We have only an
educated hunch, often based on folklore and our anecdotal ex-
periences, of what kind of folks we want on our jury if we
could get them. Second, identifying them through the voir dire
process is a real problem. The atmosphere is artificial and
stilted, and we are not really trained in conducting conversa-
tions with prospective jurors in every day language. The process
is not helped by the fact that by the time we get to examine the
prospective jurors, the trial judge has been required by law to
ask them a series of stilted questions, hardly designed to elicit
anything useful. 1 At the close of voir dire, we are often left
with little more than we gleaned from examining the data con-
tained in the jury list to inform our hunches.
All of these problems are present and magnified in a capital
case, and there are more. In one process, we are to select a jury
that will adhere to the presumption of innocence, give our client
a fair trial on the merits, AND upon a finding of guilt of
capital murder, not be predisposed to kill him. Moreover, the
common defense counsel dilemma of trying to succeed at trial
while making a proper record for appellate review is magnified
in capital cases. In every phase of a capital case, including jury
selection, it must be remembered that the Virginia Supreme
Court will not have the only look or the last word on errors of
law. But if errors are made by the court, they must be fully
documented and objections made and preserved on all ap-
plicable grounds, INCLUDING FEDERAL GROUNDS. Other-
wise, meritorious claims may be lost, and a person executed for
whom the law says death is not the appropriate penalty. It has
happened. 2 Capital jury selection is indeed a daunting task, but
if we know what the law requires and what selection strategies
have been successful, a fair jury can be found.
In capital cases, providing effective assistance of counsel re-
quires that you investigate possible challenges to the array from
which both the grand jury and petit jury are drawn, and that in
some instances you even challenge the Commonwealth's use of
peremptory challenges. All of these possible challenges are
grounded in the right of an accused to be tried by a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community, that is from which
no cognizable group has been systematically excluded. 3 These
issues will be discussed in the second half of this article.
Providing effective assistance of counsel in capital cases also
requires that you do all in your power, whether the trial judge
is impatient or not, to insure that no juror will automatically
vote for death upon being satisfied that your client is guilty of
capital murder, but rather that the juror will fairly consider all
mitigating factors approved by the General Assembly as well as
any other aspect of defendant's character, record or cir-
cumstances of the offense that he proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death. 4 You are also required to insure that
prospective jurors who have conscientously held scruples against
the imposition of the death penalty, but who could consider
every penalty provided by law, including the death penalty are
not successfully challenged for cause. It is to the law and
techniques for fulfilling this duty that I turn first.
A. DEATH AND LIFE QUALIFIED JURY
1. Law
The 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial
jury. The Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that this
guarantee is also one of an impartial sentencing jury. 5 As
judges and Commonwealth Attorneys are aware, however, some
opponents of the death penalty may be systematically excluded
from serving on a capital jury. An unlimited number of
challenges for cause may be used to exclude them. The most
widely known test for excludability comes from the famous case
of Witherspoon v. Illinois,6 providing for exclusion of jurors
who make it unmistakably clear during voir dire that they
would automatically vote against the imposition of the death
penalty without regard to any evidence that might be developed
at trial, or that their opposition to the death penalty would pre-
vent them from making an impartial decision about guilt. You
can expect that the prosecutor, and sometimes the judge, will
ask a series of questions about this qualification and will follow
